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Abstract
We propose a model where wholesale electricity prices are explained by
two state variables: demand and capacity. We derive analytical expressions to
price forward contracts and to calculate the forward premium. We apply our
model to the PJM, England and Wales, and Nord Pool markets. Our empirical
findings indicate that volatility of demand is seasonal and that the market price
of demand risk is also seasonal and positive, both of which exert an upward
(seasonal) pressure on the price of forward contracts. We assume that both
volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk are constant and
find that, depending on the market and period under study, it could either
exert an upward or downward pressure on forward prices. In all markets we
find that the forward premium exhibits a seasonal pattern. During the months
of high volatility of demand, forward contracts trade at a premium. During
months of low volatility of demand, forwards can either trade at a relatively
small premium or, even in some cases, at a discount, i.e. they exhibit a negative
forward premium.
Keywords: power prices, demand, capacity, forward premium, forward bias,
market price of capacity risk, market price of demand risk, PJM, England and
Wales, Nord Pool
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1 Introduction
Although electricity is considered to be a commodity, its price behavior is strikingly
different from that of any other commodity or more generally from that of any other
asset. The most conspicuous features of its price dynamics are the presence of a
seasonal trend and short-lived deviations or spikes with strong mean reversion, a
unique characteristic of the power market. The latter behavior is a consequence of
the complex dynamics of, and the interaction between, the demand and supply of a
commodity which is either impossible or un-economical to store.
This inability to store power is perhaps the pivotal reason for the extreme be-
havior of electricity’s price dynamics. Unlike most commodities, once electricity is
produced it must be consumed. When storing a commodity is feasible, mismatches
between demand and supply can be partially met by either storing the good or by
drawing from inventories. In this way, storage capabilities act as a buffer and have the
effect of smoothing out price deviations from their expected seasonal trend. A clear
example is gas, where storage levels follow a seasonal profile that reflects net demand
or supply. Where demand outstrips supply, usually between the months of Decem-
ber through April, inventories are depleted; where supply exceeds demand storage
facilities are replenished. However, contrary to the way inventories act against sharp
price deviations in most commodities, the absence of storage in electricity markets
amplifies the effects produced by mismatches between supply and demand.
Moreover, the adverse consequences of not being able to store power are exac-
erbated by the composition of the generation park of every market. There are two
sides to this problem that must be considered. First, in most markets around the
world, the vast majority of generation capacity is concentrated in a small number of
3
companies that own generation plants. Therefore the actions or performance of just
one player in the market may have an impact on equilibrium prices. Furthermore, due
to the economies of scale in this market, investments come in large tranches, hence
installed capacity increases in steps rather than in a gradual manner. The immediate
implication is that power supply takes the form of a ‘supply stack’ since different
plants come on line at different prices which, makes equilibrium prices very unstable
around these step changes.
The second aspect that must be contemplated is that every generation park con-
sists of a heterogeneous ensemble of plants where the main characteristic that dif-
ferentiates them is the source employed to produce power and their cost function
(marginal costs). For instance, the Scandinavian power market is dominated by hy-
dro plants, but most of the time the marginal plants that determine equilibrium prices
are coal, gas or oil-based. Similarly, in the England and Wales (E&W) market gas and
coal plants, representing around 60% of generation capacity, are usually the marginal
entrants that set prices.
Nevertheless, the peculiarities of the supply side are not solely responsible for
the exceptional behavior of power prices. Aggregate demand is highly inelastic and
mainly dependent on weather and economic activity. Short-term unexpected demand
variations are normally attributed to changes in weather, but on a longer time scale,
the different seasons of the year, together with the economic cycle, also affect the
seasonal trend that underlies aggregate demand.
The main contribution of this article is to introduce a general framework that
analyzes how demand and capacity determine wholesale electricity prices. We propose
a flexible model that allows different specifications both for the modeling of the state
variables (demand and capacity) and for the relationship between state variables and
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electricity prices. Moreover, the specification of our model allows us to obtain closed-
form solutions for forward prices which enables us to directly examine the dynamics
of the forward premium. Finally, we exemplify the use of our model by analyzing the
markets of PJM, E&W and Nord Pool.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present an overview
of previous work on the valuation of electricity derivatives. Section 3 analyzes the
characteristics of the supply and demand of electricity. In Section 4 we propose the
model for the electricity spot price as a function of demand and generation capacity.
Further, in Section 5 we present the model under the risk-adjusted probability mea-
sure, derive valuation formulæ for forward contracts and discuss the forward premium.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Models for the valuation of electricity deriva-
tives
Modeling power prices, and other financial instruments related to this market, is quite
recent in the academic literature. For instance, although the subject matter was not
the modeling of power prices but storable commodities, the work of Schwartz (1997)
and Schwartz and Smith (2000) served as a platform for a number of articles that
dealt with the valuation of electricity derivatives by proposing no-arbitrage models
for the dynamics of wholesale electricity prices. For example, in the work of Luc´ıa
and Schwartz (2002) and Villaplana (2005) power prices are modeled according to
non-observable state variables that account for the short-term movements and long-
term trends in electricity prices. In particular, the former looks into the valuation of
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electricity futures contracts traded in the Nord Pool (Scandinavian market), and the
latter introduces the possibility of jumps in the short-term process of the Schwartz and
Smith (2000) model, derives valuation formulæ for forward contracts and undertakes
an empirical analysis of the PJM market. Similarly, Cartea and Figueroa (2005)
present a mean-reverting jump-diffusion model of wholesale electricity prices and
derive closed-form formulæ for forward contracts and apply the model to the E&W
power market. Finally, Geman and Roncoroni (2006) focuses on the modeling of spot
prices and apply their model to the PJM, ECAR and COB markets.
Alternatives to no-arbitrage models are the so-called equilibrium and hybrid mod-
els which, given the particular characteristics of electricity, explain price formation
based on state variables that are mainly associated to supply and demand. This line
of research has been pursued in Geman and Eydeland (1998), Pirrong and Jermakyan
(1999), Pirrong and Jermakyan (2000), Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), Longstaff
and Wang (2004), Barlow (2002), Skantze, Gubina, and Ilic (2000) and Skantze and
Ilic (2001) among others.
For example, Pirrong and Jermakyan (1999) and Pirrong and Jermakyan (2000)
propose to model the equilibrium price as a function of two state variables, electricity
demand and the futures price of the marginal fuel. Moreover, the authors consider
that electricity prices should be an increasing and convex function of demand.
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) adopted an equilibrium perspective and ex-
plicitly modeled the economic determinants of the forward market. In their model,
producers face marginal production costs that may increase steeply with output and
aggregate demand is exogenous and stochastic. They show that the forward premium,
defined as the forward minus the expected spot price, is positively (resp. negatively)
related to the skewness (resp. variance) of the spot price. One of the key insights
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is that the risk of price spikes, due to sudden positive shocks in power demand, can
have important effects on the size and the sign of the forward premium. In their
equilibrium model, the resulting expression for spot prices is given by the following
expression: P = a (D/N)k−1, where P is the electricity spot price, D is the demand
level, N number of (symmetric) producers (generators), and a and k > 2 are con-
stants. Note that assuming N constant is equivalent to assuming that generation
capacity is also known and fixed.
Longstaff and Wang (2004) focus on the question of how electricity forward prices
are related to expected spot prices. Their goal is to provide an empirical analysis
of the theoretical predictions presented in Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). They
find a significant forward premium in the PJM market which they consider as being
the result of “the rationality and risk aversion of economic agents participating in the
market”. They point out that “total demand approaching or exceeding the physical
limits of power generation” is an important economic risk (related also to quantity
risk) and “the risk of price spikes as demand approaches system capacity is an extreme
type of risk which may have important implications for the relation between spot and
forward prices”.
Therefore in those situations where the demand level is near the maximum ca-
pacity of the system, the behavior of electricity prices can be quite abrupt, since
electricity must be generated by plants with higher marginal costs (convexity of the
supply function). Furthermore, although Longstaff and Wang (2004) try to establish
a relationship between the forward premium and the difference between maximum ca-
pacity and expected demand, they must assume (due to lack of data) that generating
capacity is constant.
Furthermore, Barlow (2002), Skantze, Gubina, and Ilic (2000) and Skantze and
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Ilic (2001) have in common the fact that they impose a functional form for the re-
lationship between price and two state variables: demand and a non-specified vari-
able related to the supply side. For instance, Barlow (2002) proposed a non-linear
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for the description of observed electricity prices. The
author considered demand as the relevant state variable and modeled it as a mean-
reverting process incorporating a non-constant mean given by a deterministic sea-
sonal function. Skantze, Gubina, and Ilic (2000) and Skantze and Ilic (2001) impose
an exponential functional form between electricity spot prices and the state variables
demand and a non-observable residual variable which is related to supply conditions.
In this article we model equilibrium electricity prices as a function of two ob-
servable state variables: demand and generation capacity. In this way we extend
the work of Pirrong and Jermakyan (1999), Barlow (2002) and Bessembinder and
Lemmon (2002) by considering the capacity of a system to generate electricity at
any point in time as a random variable, in other words, capacity follows a stochastic
process. Moreover, based on empirical observations and in line with Bessembinder
and Lemmon (2002), we assume that electricity prices are increasing in demand and
decreasing in capacity. Yet we propose a model flexible enough so that forward prices,
a key building block in power markets, can be priced in closed-form, which also allows
us to gain further insights into the characteristics of power markets by examining the
forward premium for which we also obtain an analytical expression.
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3 Demand and effective generation capacity
3.1 Demand
As mentioned above there are two key drivers that affect power demand: economic
activity and weather conditions. On a broad level, the seasonal behavior of these
drivers is passed onto the dynamics of power prices. For instance, the relationship
between economic activity and electricity demand makes load (i.e. out-turn or realized
demand) a seasonal variable too. Similarly, on short-time scales, electricity demand
exhibits intra-day and intra-week seasonality with clearly discernible patterns. Within
working days, for example, one can identify high demand (mornings and evenings) and
low demand hours (generally from midnight to 6:00 am). And likewise, throughout
the week, we may also observe that demand is higher during weekdays and lower
during weekends and public holidays.
Weather, on the other hand, also influences electricity demand; temperature being
one of the most influential factors. Extreme temperatures, high or low, induce a
considerable use of air-conditioners or heating devices. As with cycles in economic
activity, the marked seasonal patterns such as winters and summers are generally
reflected in the seasonal levels of electricity prices. However, on short-time scales,
electricity demand usually depends non-linearly on temperature (see Pardo, Meneu,
and Valor (2002)) which makes volatility of demand very sensitive to short-term
weather variations; an effect which is exacerbated during periods of already high
demand.
Therefore electricity demand may be modeled as a mean-reverting process, where
the mean is non-constant (seasonal) and with periods of high and low volatility. In
order to take into account these features, we introduce several components in our
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model for the evolution demand. We assume
Dt = g
D(t) + χDt (1)
dχDt = −k
DχDt dt+ σD(t)dZ
D
t (2)
where demand Dt has a non-constant, deterministic trend given by the function g
D(t),
and χDt is a mean-reverting process, with seasonal volatility captured by the term
σD(t) and dZ
D
t are the increments of a standard Brownian motion.
1
From Figures 1, 2 and 3 it is straightforward to observe that the behavior of
demand is different in each market.2 These differences are important in order to
understand the behavior of spot prices, forward prices and forward premiums. For
example, it is important to emphasize that demand levels in the PJM market exhibits
the largest volatility and that the Nord Pool shows the largest kurtosis (see Table 1).
Insert table 1 about here
We employ daily demand data to estimate a discretized version of the demand
model, (1) and (2), and obtain the parameter estimates by Maximum Likelihood.3
1We note that a simple extension to model (1), (2) would consist of adding another factor to
capture long-term shocks in the following way
Dt = g
D(t) + χDt + ξt
dχDt = −k
DχDdt+ σD(t)dZ
D
t
dξ = µξdt+ σξdZ
ξ
t
where µξ and σξ are constant and dZ
ξ
t are the increments of a standard Brownian motion. With
this specification the long-term equilibrium level gD(t) + ξt is not deterministic.
2In each market we use the day-ahead demand.
3Since we are dealing with daily data, the discretization error is negligible, Melino (1994). The
models have been estimated using the BHHH algorithm.
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The discretized version of the demand model is given by
Dt = g
D(t) + χDt (4)
χDt = Bχ
D
t−1 + σD,tεt. (5)
Here (5) is an autoregressive form of (2) where B = 1− kD, εt ∼ N(0, 1) and
σD,t = σ
D
1 wintert + σ
D
2 springt + σ
D
3 fallt + σ
D
4 summert (6)
is designed to capture the seasonal component of the time-dependent volatility by
including quarterly dummies: fallt takes the value 1 if the observation is on September,
October or November and zero the rest of the months; springt takes the value of 1
if the observation is March, April and May or zero in the rest of months; summert
takes the value 1 if the observation is in June, July or August and zero the rest of
the months; and wintert is similarly defined. Finally, depending on the market, the
seasonal component is given by
gD(t) = B0 +
12∑
j=2
MjD
M
j +
y∑
j=2
YjD
Y
j (7)
or
gD(t) = B0 +
12∑
j=2
MjD
M
j + Ct. (8)
Here DMj are the monthly dummies that take into account the existence of discrete
changes in the annual mean level of the demand series; DYj are the yearly dummies
(y varies depending on the market); Mj and Yj are parameters; and C is a parameter
responsible for the linear trend in (8).
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Table 2 shows parameter estimates for the demand model (4)-(6) applied to three
markets: PJM, E&W and Nord Pool. Moreover, we used (7) for PJM and Nord
Pool and (8) for E&W. For comparison purposes we have estimated two different
specifications for the volatility of demand in each market. The first specification
assumes the volatility is constant σD(t) = σ
D
const (results shown in columns with
heading ‘Const Vol’) and the other assumes that volatility is seasonal as described
in (6) (results shown under heading ‘Seas Vol’). From the table we see that in all
markets, the quarterly dummies of the seasonal volatility specification are significant,
moreover, according to the Schwarz Criterion, the seasonal volatility model is the
preferred one. Finally, we have computed a LR test to check the difference between
the restricted model (constant volatility model) and the unrestricted one (seasonal
volatility specification), where we find that in the three markets the null hypothesis
is clearly rejected at 1% significant levels.
Insert Table 2 here
It is interesting to mention the relationship between the level gD(t) of the demand
series and the seasonal pattern in the volatility of the series. For example, Figure
2 shows demand in E&W over the period March 2001 to March 2006. Here we
can observe that periods of high demand, i.e. high levels in gD(t), occur during the
months of August through December. At the same time we observe from Table 2 that
volatility σD(t) is also higher during the summer and fall seasons (i.e. June through
November) coinciding with the times when gD(t) is already high. This feature, which
is broadly present across the three different markets under study, will have interesting
consequences. First, a straightforward effect is that across seasons when demand levels
and volatility of demand are high, wholesale power prices will also, ceteris paribus,
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be high and volatile. Second, we can expect forward prices and the forward premium
to reflect a seasonal pattern as a result of seasonality in the volatility of demand. We
will me more precise about this last point in Section 4 when we present a model for
power prices and in Section 5 where we study the forward premium.
Insert Figure 1 here
Insert Figure 2 here
Insert Figure 3 here
3.2 Generation capacity
The inclusion of demand as a state variable is as important as the inclusion of ef-
fective generation capacity to explain the dynamics of spot or forward prices. The
former accounts for the dynamics of aggregate demand and the latter accounts for the
dynamics of the supply stack, yet it is the interaction between the two at every point
in time (for example half-hour slots) what determines equilibrium market prices.
There are different definitions of capacity. One working definition of capacity is the
maximum level of energy that can be produced at a point in time. In an ideal situation
this figure should incorporate all generation that can be made available should the
system operator call upon it. Hence, planned maintenance or other circumstances
that reduce or increase the ability to generate power should already be accounted for
when capacity is reported (see Cartea, Figueroa, and Geman (2007)).
One level of difficulty we face stems from the fact that not all markets are the
same and that publicly available information also differs across them. For example,
in the Nord Pool market it is relatively straightforward to obtain figures for reservoir
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levels, but capacity derived from other generation sources is not readily available.
Therefore, when looking at the Scandinavian market we will use hydro reservoir as
a proxy for total capacity. In the E&W market, information on capacity (surplus) is
made public by the National Grid Company (NGC). Finally, for the PJM market we
use installed capacity.4
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the proxies we use for generation capacity for the three
markets we study. For instance, Figure 7 shows installed capacity in the PJM market
over the period January 1999 through August 2006; Figure 8 shows E&W daily
observations of capacity surplus over the period March 2001 through March 2006;
and Figure 9 shows reservoir levels for the Nord Pool over the period January 1999
through December 2006. Although the information we have relating to capacity
differs across markets, it is clear from the figures that capacity cannot be considered
a deterministic variable, instead, capacity must be considered as a state variable that
exhibits two main characteristics. First, a predictable component since some of the
fluctuations on generation capacity may be known in advance by market participants
(for instance because of the existence of seasonality and/or planned outages). Second,
short-lived deviations that are considered random shocks to the expected available
capacity in the market.
Insert Figure 7 here
Insert Figure 8 here
Insert Figure 9 here
4Information for Nord Pool is obtained from www.nordpool.com; for E&W is obtained from via
www.bmreports.com where we use the surplus variable SLPD; and for PJM from www.pjm.com.
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We note that although reductions in available capacity are planned, and may be
known by market participants, they have also been the cause of some of the jumps
observed in price series. As an example, Krapels (2000) shows how the increase in
prices in the New England market during 7-8 June 1999, was due to a combination of
a known reduction in available capacity plus an unexpected increase in demand which
could not be met because power plants could not be ramped up in time. Another
example is Nord Pool where during the last months of 2002 and the beginning of
2003 the level of hydro reservoirs was at a historical low, and consequently, spot and
forward prices underwent a sharp increase.
Kollberg, Elf, Wigert, Lundquist, Mork, and Cho (1999) present further examples
of how important the relationship between generation capacity and levels of forward
prices in Nord Pool is: “... a shock that affected futures prices at Nord Pool was the
decision by the Swedish government to close down one nuclear reactor at Barseba¨ck.
At a time when the supply of electricity was already regarded as constrained in the
Nordic region, this decision to cut production resources even further made the market
react in a powerful way. Suddenly, there was a shift in all forward and futures con-
tracts with maturity after the closing date”. Therefore, fluctuations in price levels or
short-lived price spikes are not caused by abrupt changes in demand alone, but also,
possibly contributing on an equal footing, by changes in generation capacity.
Therefore, given the characteristics of the variable capacity we propose the fol-
lowing model for capacity:
Ct = g
C(t) + χCt (9)
dχCt = −k
CχCt dt+ σC(t)dZ
C
t . (10)
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Here gC(t) represents a deterministic seasonal component present in capacity and χCt
is a mean-reverting process with speed of reversion kC , volatility captured by σC(t)
and dZCt are the increments of a standard Brownian motion.
5
In order to estimate empirically the parameters of the model given by equations
(9) and (10) we use a discretized version of the model similar to the one used in
the demand case. Depending on the market, we use different specifications for the
seasonal component. For instance, in Nord Pool we modeled gC(t) as
gC(t) = B0 +
12∑
j=2
MjD
M
j +
y∑
j=2
YjD
Y
j (11)
and in E&W we used
gC(t) = B0 +
12∑
j=2
MjD
M
j + Ct (12)
where the dummies and parameters have the same interpretation as in the seasonal
component for demand. For example, in specification (11), monthly and annual
dummies are included in order to capture the changes on the level of the capacity
variable for the different months of the year and for the different years.
For PJM we used a different approach due to the nature of the data we have for
capacity. For example, from Figure 7 we observe the existence of important discrete
and permanent changes in the PJM capacity variable mainly as a consequence of a
planned expansion of the PJMmarket (see FERC (2002)). Therefore the deterministic
trend gC(t) is calculated as the mean of the monthly available capacity and the mean
5As in the demand model above we could also add another factor to account for long-term
stochastic changes in the capacity levels. Furthermore, depending on the particular market under
consideration, it could be desirable to add jumps in the dynamics of the short-term shocks χCt to
account for sudden unexpected changes in available capacity that cannot be captured by diffusive
shocks.
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reverting component χCt is given by the difference between our proxy for capacity and
the monthly means.
In the case of the PJM market we estimate kC and σC(t), employing autoregressive
of order 1 model. In all markets we assumed that the volatility coefficient in (10) is
constant, i.e. σC(t) = σ
C . The estimation results for PJM are B = 0.70 (recall that
B = 1− kC) and σC = 107.13. The results for E&W and Nord Pool are reported in
Table 3.
Insert Table 3 here
4 The model: the relationship between spot prices
and state variables
Based on empirical evidence we know spot prices should be increasing in demand
and decreasing in capacity. Therefore, we may specify a generic function ϕ (·) such
that wholesale power prices are given by Pt = ϕ (Dt, Ct) and require ∂ϕ/∂D > 0 and
∂ϕ/∂C < 0.
In addition to requiring ϕ(·, ·) to be increasing in demand and decreasing in ca-
pacity, we look for plausible functional forms so that forward prices can be expressed
in closed-form. Hence, we propose the following model:
Pt = βe
γCt+αDt , α > 0, γ < 0, β > 0, (13)
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where
Dt = g
D(t) + χDt (14a)
dχDt = −k
DχDt dt+ σD(t)dZ
D
t , (14b)
Ct = g
C(t) + χCt (14c)
dχCt = −k
CχCt dt+ σ
CdZCt , (14d)
and the standard Brownian motions ZDt and Z
C
t are independent. Then, by applying
the natural logarithm to (13), we can write
lnPt = h(t) + γχ
C
t + αχ
D
t (15)
where h(t) = ln β + γgC(t) + αgD(t). Further, we will assume that the seasonal
component h(t) has the same form as (7).
Before presenting the model under the risk-neutral probability measure, and de-
riving valuation formulæ for forwards, we present some preliminary evidence about
the adequacy of the proposed specification.
For example, by letting α = 0, we can analyze a restricted version of model (13).
One can show that in this “pure capacity” model the logarithm of the expected-price
is given by the following expression:
lnEPt [PT ] = ln β + γg
C(T ) + γ
(
e−k
C(T−t)χCt +
∫ T
t
e−2k
C(T−s)(σC)2ds
)
,
where EPt is the expectation operator with respect to the statistical measure P with
information up until time t. It must be noted that the parameter γ < 0 implies that
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expected power prices are decreasing,6 at an increasing rate, in capacity. For example,
if capacity goes down (resp. up) prices go up (resp. down). On the other hand, we
can also check the effect of seasonal changes in capacity on the expected price. For
instance, during months of high capacity, i.e. high gC(T ), expected prices are rela-
tively lower than months with low seasonal capacity. Similarly, it is straightforward
to see that positive (resp. negative) short-term deviations χCt exert a downward (resp.
upward) pressure on expected prices and that this pressure decays at an exponential
rate given by the speed of mean reversion kC .
To estimate the parameters α and γ we follow two steps. First, we deseasonalize
the demand and capacity series using the results from the models (1), (2) and (9),
(10). Second, using the deseasonalized series for demand and capacity, χDt and χ
C
t ,
we estimate h(t), α and γ in (15) by Maximum Likelihood and report the results in
Table 4. For example, we can see that for all markets the parameters α and γ possess
the correct sign and are statistically significant.
Insert Table 4 here
5 Valuation of futures contracts
In order to value derivatives contracts we have to express model (13) under a risk-
neutral probability measure. In line with the literature on commodities, we incorpo-
rate the price of risk for the different sources of uncertainty in the same way as in, for
example, Schwartz (1997) and Cartea and Figueroa (2005). In our case, the sources
of uncertainty are the demand and the effective generation capacity, and therefore
we introduce two additional parameters
(
φD(t), φC(t)
)
: the time-dependent market
6Assuming that gC(T ) +
(
e−k
C(T−t)χCt +
∫ T
t
e−2k
C(T−s)(σC)2ds
)
> 0.
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price per unit of demand and capacity risk, respectively. Consequently, under the
risk-neutral probability measure Q the specification of the model is given by:
lnPt = h(t) + γχ
C
t + αχ
D
t (16a)
dχDt = −k
D(χDt + θ
D(t))dt+ σD(t)dW
D
t (16b)
dχCt = −k
C(χCt + θ
C(t))dt+ σCdWCt (16c)
where dWDt and dW
C
t are the increments of two independent, standard Brownian
motions, and
θD(t) =
φD(t)σD(t)
kD
, (17)
θC(t) =
φC(t)σC
kC
, (18)
h(t), σD(t), σC , kD, kC have the same interpretation as above.
Integrating equations (16b) and (16c) over the time interval (t, T ) yields:
lnPT = h(T )
+γ
(
e−k
C(T−t)χCt + k
C
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)θC(s)ds+
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)σCdWCs
)
+α
(
e−k
D(T−t)χDt + k
D
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)θD(s)ds+
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)σD(s)dW
D
s
)
,
(19)
thus we can calculate the log-price of a forward contract at time t delivering one
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MWh, at a pre-specified future date T ,
ln f (t, T ) = lnEQt [PT ]
= h(T )
+γ
(
e−k
C(T−t)χCt + k
C
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)θC(s)ds+
∫ T
t
e−2k
C(T−s)(σC)2ds
)
+α
(
e−k
D(T−t)χDt + k
D
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)θD(s)ds+
∫ T
t
e−2k
D(T−s)σ2D(s)ds
)
,
(20)
where EQt is the expectation operator with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q with
information up until time t.
We may also write the price of the forward contract as the product of the expected
price of power, under the physical measure P, EPt [PT ] and a correction factor that
depends on the market prices of demand and capacity risk:
f(t, T ) = exp
[
γkC
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)θC(s)ds+ αkD
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)θD(s)ds
]
E
P
t [PT ]. (21)
Hence, the forward premium FP (t, T ), can be written as
FP (t, T ) = EQt [PT ]− E
P
t [PT ]
= f(t, T )− EPt [PT ]
=
(
exp
[
γkC
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)θC(s)ds+ αkD
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)θD(s)ds
]
− 1
)
E
P
t [PT ],
(22)
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which also allows us to study the sign of the forward premium by looking at
sign{FP (t, T )} = sign
{
γkC
∫ T
t
e−k
C(T−s)θC(s)ds+ αkD
∫ T
t
e−k
D(T−s)θD(s)ds
}
.
(23)
One of the main advantages of our model is that we are able to express in an
analytical way both the forward prices and the forward premiums. In commodities
markets, and especially in power markets, understanding the behavior of the forward
premium poses interesting challenges (see for example Benth, Cartea, and Kiesel
(2007)). One can focus attention on the forward bias itself (22), or focus on the
question of whether forward prices are trading above (i.e. FP (t, T ) > 0) or below
(i.e. FP (t, T ) < 0) the expected spot price. Thus, if we focus on the sign of the
forward bias (23), we can see that the two key components that affect FP (t, T ) are
the market prices of demand and capacity risk, which are in the functions θD(t) in (17)
and θC(t) in (18). For example, if over the interval (t, T ) the market price of demand
risk φD(s) < 0, then θD(s) < 0, in the same interval. This induces a downward
pressure on the price of the forward f(t, T ), as can be seen from expression (21).
Conversely, if over the interval (t, T ) φC(s) > 0, then θC(s) > 0. This exerts a
downward pressure on forward prices (recall that γ < 0).
Other interesting results arise from considering how volatility of demand or volatil-
ity of capacity affects the forward premium. For example, if for simplicity we assume
that γ = 0 and that over a relevant time interval (for instance a season) the param-
eters φD(t), σD(t) are constant, then the size and sign of the forward premium only
depend on the size and sign of θD(t). Furthermore, although the sign of θD(t) is de-
termined by the sign of φD(t), it is not clear whether periods of high or low volatility
of demand are accompanied by positive or negative φD(t).
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According to Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) the forward premium is decreas-
ing in the variance of power prices and increasing in the skewness of power prices.
In our model, although shocks to demand and capacity are symmetric, an increase
in the volatility of demand or capacity increases both the variance and the skewness
of power prices as a result of the convexity of the exponential function. Therefore
during periods of high σD(t) there would be two opposing forces acting on the forward
premium FP (t, T ) and this is why we cannot unambiguously determine the sign of
the term φD(t). A similar argument applies to the relationship between the sign of
φC(t) and the size of σC .
5.1 The forward premium
The forward premium is an interesting quantity because it allows us to interpret how
‘strong’ hedging pressures from buyers and sellers of electricity are. For example, a
positive forward premium indicates that forward contracts are trading at a premium
over and above expected spot prices due to pressure from buyers. In our analysis
we still need to estimate the risk-neutral parameters relating to the market prices of
demand φD(t) and capacity φC(t) risk.7 For PJM, E&W and Nord Pool we employ
Nonlinear Least Squares to estimate φD(t) and φC(t) from monthly forwards, and
since (20) is for delivery in one day, we use, as in Luc´ıa and Schwartz (2002),
F (t, T1, T2) =
1
T2 − T1
n∑
i=1
f(t, τi) T1 < T2, (24)
where T1 and T2 are the start and finish of the delivery period, n is the number of
days between T1 and T2 and f(t, τi) is given by (20). Furthermore, partly due to:
7The other parameters have already been estimated under the physical measure.
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simplicity; the type of data we have as proxies for capacity; and the fact that we
have assumed that the volatility of capacity is constant (σC(t) = σ
C), we assume
that the market price of capacity risk is constant, i.e. φC(t) = φC . However, on the
other hand, we assume that the market price of demand risk is constant within the
different seasons in the same way that we assumed that volatility of demand σD(t)
was also constant within seasons.
To estimate the market prices of risk we build on the results obtained from esti-
mating the model under the physical measure. We use the deseasonalized demand
and capacity series; the mean reversion coefficients kD and kC ; the (seasonal) volatil-
ity of demand σD(t) and volatility of capacity σC (all obtained in sections 3.1 and
3.2); and h(t), α and γ obtained in section 4. The last step consists of estimating
the market prices of capacity and demand risk. We estimate them by minimizing the
sum of squared deviations between theoretical forward prices, given by (24), and daily
quotes for monthly forwards in each market. Moreover, for each monthly contract we
take observations of the price of the contract every day, until start of delivery, where
the first price is that observed one month prior to the start of delivery.8
Studies such as Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), Pirrong and Jermakyan (1999
and 2000) and Villaplana (2005) present evidence for and discuss the existence of a
seasonal pattern in the forward premium on the PJM. Our framework allows us to
understand the different components that affect the seasonality, magnitude and sign
of the forward premium. In our model the seasonal trends present in the volatility of
demand σD(t) and in the market price of demand risk φD(t), are the main drivers of
the seasonal pattern exhibited by the forward premium (recall that we have market
8For example, for a forward delivering throughout the month of March, we use the forward price
of the March contract for every day it was traded during the month of February.
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price of capacity risk is constant). The sign and magnitude of the forward premium
on the other hand, are driven by the signs and magnitudes of φD(t), φC , σD(t) and
σC . Tables 5, 6 and 7 show our parameter estimates for the market prices of risk in
the PJM, E&W and Nord Pool.
To study the market prices of risk in the PJM market, we split the data set into
two sub-periods: 1999 to 2002; and 2002 to 2006. We do so to reflect a structural
change in the PJM which partly resulted from its expansion to other territories, which
commenced in 2002 (see FERC (2002)). Results for these two sub-periods can be seen
in Table 5. We find that the market price of capacity risk φC is statistically significant
for the periods 2002-2006, where φC < 0, and the year 1999, where φC > 0. With
regards to the market price of demand risk, there are three points to note. First, for
both the periods, January 1999 to March 2002 and April 2002 to August 2006, the
market prices of demand risk are statistically significant, with the exception of the
months August, September and October in the sample April 2002 to August 2006.
Second, the signs of the statistically significant parameters φD(t) are positive in all
cases. Third, the periods with largest market price of demand risk coincide with the
periods of largest positive forward premium.
Insert Table 5 here
In the three markets we study, our empirical findings indicate that the forward
premium is higher in those contracts that mature in periods of high volatility of de-
mand. To calculate the forward premium we take the difference between forward
prices, obtained from the fitted model, and expected spot price based on the pa-
rameter estimates derived above. For example, from Table 2 we can verify that the
months with the highest volatility of demand in the PJM market are June, July and
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August and those with the second highest volatility value are September, October and
November. Moreover, in PJM during the sub-period 1999-2002 we can see that the
months of May, June and July,9 (which exhibit the largest forward premium ranging
between $30 and $75 as shown in Figure 10) coincide with the months where we found
that the volatility of demand was highest and the market price of demand risk was
also highest.10
In PJM we also observe that the forward premium is negative during the months
of January, February, November and December in 1999. In this year φC > 0 and hence
the market price of capacity risk exerts a downward pressure, whilst the market price
of demand risk applies an upward pressure, on the forward prices. It is during the
months where volatility of demand is relatively low that we see a downward pressure
due to capacity risk outweighing the effects of a positive market price of demand risk.
This results in a negative forward premium. We provide an intuitive explanation of the
negative forward premium in two steps. First, since during months of low volatility
of demand the probability of observing price spikes is relatively low, buyers have
fewer incentives to cover their positions by purchasing power forward, but sellers still
prefer to sell forward contracts to reduce variability in their profits. This reasoning
applies at all times when the volatility of demand is low, but does not imply that
the forward premium must be negative, it only implies that the contribution to the
forward premium due to demand risk and price spikes is not too large during periods
of low demand and low volatility of demand.
The second leg of the argument is based on the fact that sellers face variability
9We remark that the period with high volatility of demand aligns with that of high forward
premium because we are looking at monthly forwards that trade in May, June and July, but with
delivery period in June, July and August.
10When we look at particular years or subsets of the data to estimate the market prices of risk
and capacity, we do not re-estimate the other parameters of the model.
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of power prices due to unexpected changes in the total generation capacity of the
system. Positive capacity shocks reduce power prices and negative shocks increase
power prices. During times of low demand and low volatility of demand, it is less likely
to see price spikes as a result of a fall in capacity. Hence, although sellers would like to
take advantage of possible price spikes, due to negative capacity shocks, by selling spot
rather than forward, their fear of price falls, due to unexpected positive movements
in the total generation capacity, provides a much stronger incentive to sell forward
contracts. Hence, this willingness to hedge risks, induced by random deviations in
capacity, drives forward prices down. In some circumstances, this downward pressure
is strong enough to drive discounts up to the extent that expected spot prices are
higher than forward prices (thus generating a negative forward premium).
We can compare our results for the years 1999 and 2000 with those of Bessem-
binder and Lemmon (2002), where our findings are broadly in agreement (signs and
magnitudes). From Figures 12 and 13 we can observe that the lowest forward pre-
mium occurs between the months of January to May and September to December.
Insert Figure 10 and 11 here
Insert Figure 12 and 13 here
Insert Table 5 here
Similarly, we can interpret the results for the E&W market. In Table 6 we present
the estimation results for the market prices of demand and capacity risk. We employ
forward contracts data from April 2001 to December 2005 and present results for the
whole series and for the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. For the entire data set we see
that φC is positive and statistically significant and that the largest φD(t) are those
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encompassing the months August through January. During these months, a large
positive market price of demand risk is also accompanied by a period of high volatil-
ity of demand. The combined effect of a large positive φD(t) and large σD(t) exerts
an upward pressure on the monthly forward contracts trading in the months Au-
gust through January, with delivery in September through February. Consequently,
monthly forward contracts trade significantly above the expected prices of electricity;
in other words, there is a substantial forward premium during these months.
Figure 14 depicts the forward premium in E&W for the period April 2001 to De-
cember 2005. We observe that this premium is highest between August and January
of each year, ranging between £2 and £9 per MWh, and that it also follows a sea-
sonal pattern (due mainly to the seasonality of the volatility of demand). On the
other hand, during the rest of the year, forward contracts trade at a considerable
discount, as revealed by a forward premium ranging between £-2 and £-9 per MWh.
We can interpret this negative forward premium in the same way as in the PJM.
Moreover, in the appendix we show the forward premium for 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005 (see Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18).
Insert Table 6 here
Insert Figure 14 here
Finally, Table 7 presents the market prices of demand and capacity risk for the
Nord Pool market. We focus on the period 2003-2006 and also look at the years
2004, 2005 and 2006. In all cases the market prices of capacity and demand risk
are statistically significant. Over the period 2003-2006 we observe that the months
with negative FP (t, T ) are February, May, June and July; the latter three months
coinciding with the periods of lowest volatility of demand. See Figures 19, 20, 21 and
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22 below where we depict the forward premium for the whole sample 2003 to 2006
and for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006.
Insert Table 7 here
Insert Figures 19, 20, 21 and 22 about here
6 Conclusions
The main objective of this article is to propose an electricity price model that allows us
to: understand the behavior of spot prices; understand the connection between power
prices and forward contracts; and investigate the dynamics of the forward premium,
defined as the difference between forward prices and expected power prices.
We assume that wholesale electricity prices can be explained by two state variables:
demand and capacity. We model these two variables, and their relationship with
power prices, by employing data from three different markets: PJM, E&W and Nord
Pool. One of the key requirements we impose on the model is that it must be able to
express, in an analytical way, expected spot prices and the price of forward contracts.
This allows us to express the forward premium in closed-form.
We highlight five of our findings. First, in all markets, demand or load follows
a strong seasonal component and a demand model with seasonal or time-varying
volatility is preferred to one with constant volatility.
Second, in all markets, monthly forward contracts trade at a higher premium
during months of high volatility of demand. We saw that in PJM the months that
showed the highest volatility of demand also exhibited the largest forward premium.
Our calculations of the forward premium for the individual years of 1999 and 2000
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are similar to those obtained by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and can reach
levels ranging between $30 and $75 during periods of high volatility of demand in
May, June and July.
Third, in all markets, we found that in the majority of the cases when data
from monthly forwards were employed, months with high volatility of demand were
accompanied with statistically significant positive φD(t).
Fourth, we also observed in all markets that the forward premium dynamics are
seasonal. It is interesting to note that in PJM, for the years 1999 and 2000, there
are periods where the forward premium achieves negative values. Similarly, in the
E&W market we saw that during the months of February to July in 2002-2005 the
monthly forward contracts traded below the expected spot price of power, a situation
also present in the Nord Pool during the months of February, April, May June and
July during the period 2003-2006. The intuition behind this result is that during
the periods of negative forward premium, monthly forwards trade at a large discount
due to hedging pressure from sellers. Likewise, during the months between August
and January, forward contracts in E&W were trading at a high premium, indicating
hedging pressures from buyers in this market.
Finally, our findings indicate that the market price of capacity risk could be either
positive or negative depending on the market and period under study. For example,
over the period 2001 to 2005, we found that in E&W φC > 0, and over the period 2003-
2006 we found that in Nord Pool φC > 0, which applied a downward pressure on the
price of forward contracts. This pressure reflected sellers’ willingness to offer forward
contracts at a considerable discount, especially during the months of February to July
in E&W and during the months of February to July, with the exception of March,
in Nord Pool. In these months, forward contracts traded below the expected spot
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price as revealed by a forward premium ranging between £-2 and £-9 per MWh in
E&W and between NOK-1 and NOK-7 per MWh in Nord Pool. The intuition behind
this result is that during months of relatively low volatility of demand, shocks to the
supply side become more relevant to sellers who want to hedge the unwanted outcome
of price falls that result from unexpected positive shocks to generation capacity.
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PJM E&W Nord Pool
Dt Dt −Dt−1 lnDt ln (Dt/Dt−1) Dt Dt −Dt−1 lnDt ln (Dt/Dt−1) Dt Dt −Dt−1 lnDt ln (Dt/Dt−1)
Num Obs 2800 2799 2800 2799 1240 1239 1240 1239 2922 2921 2922 2991
Mean 43775.21 18.94 10.60 0.00 36433.53 8.58 10.50 0.00 14515.38 8.43 9.50 0.00
Median 34612.00 -149.00 10.45 0.00 35715.00 50.00 10.48 0.00 13142.25 -50.00 9.48 0.00
Min 20699.00 -16311.00 9.94 -0.28 25434.00 -8309.00 10.14 -0.23 5624.80 -3819.40 8.63 -0.18
Max 116187.00 16270.00 11.66 0.37 54354.00 8320.00 10.90 0.19 39227.80 6137.60 10.58 0.34
Std 20415.01 3129.13 0.41 0.07 4654.99 1217.21 0.13 0.03 6380.82 826.26 0.39 0.05
Skew 1.21 0.41 0.79 0.49 0.60 -0.32 0.30 -0.29 1.36 1.03 0.54 0.81
Kurtosis 0.23 2.85 -0.67 1.39 0.08 10.42 -0.39 9.91 1.47 6.18 -0.40 2.38
Pt Pt − Pt−1 lnPt ln (Pt/Pt−1) Pt Pt − Pt−1 lnPt ln (Pt/Pt−1) Pt Pt − Pt−1 lnPt ln (Pt/Pt−1)
Num Obs 2800 2799 2800 2799 1240 1239 1240 1239 2922 2921 2922 2991
Mean 37.48 0.01 3.50 0.00 24.87 0.02 3.10 0.00 27.47 0.00 3.19 0.00
Median 33.69 -0.41 3.52 -0.01 20.37 0.00 3.01 0.00 26.21 -0.14 3.27 -0.01
Min 8.19 -368.00 2.10 -2.61 10.39 -86.27 2.34 -1.52 3.89 -32.28 1.36 -0.77
Max 397.34 251.18 5.98 2.78 183.32 139.40 5.21 1.77 114.61 53.72 4.74 1.19
Std 22.93 16.22 0.48 0.27 14.83 7.98 0.44 0.18 14.39 2.70 0.51 0.10
Skew 4.76 -2.29 0.32 0.24 3.28 3.89 1.11 0.89 1.59 2.62 -0.20 1.72
Kurtosis 46.60 167.20 0.60 13.37 17.75 108.60 1.32 16.95 4.46 82.69 0.11 26.53
Table 1: Statistics for power prices and demand
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PJM E&W Nord Pool
Const Vol Seas Vol Const Vol Seas Vol Const Vol Seas Vol
B0 32116.15 62.05 32253.96 91.70 37131.58 154.72 37024.91 103.14 1267358.28 96.31 1268589.72 84.41
M2 -1079.54 -1.43 -1154.57 -2.49 319.85 0.69 126.86 0.17 10234.39 0.81 9316.71 0.61
M3 -3874.12 -4.96 -3916.81 -7.74 -1819.47 -5.32 -1417.90 -4.14 -40723.80 -3.65 -40631.19 -3.11
M4 -6455.70 -7.89 -6700.07 -12.33 -4884.96 -15.89 -4913.86 -11.85 -223557.88 -18.00 -224221.86 -15.69
M5 -4627.65 -7.21 -4640.05 -10.63 -6315.90 -22.56 -6313.21 -16.03 -358245.29 -25.64 -364414.32 -23.49
M6 1548.45 2.62 1692.55 2.74 -7200.07 -17.01 -7231.53 -19.57 -416490.37 -31.36 -417859.21 -34.25
M7 5840.82 10.12 6074.61 10.17 -7525.10 -12.85 -7418.93 -18.75 -463264.87 -26.71 -466017.54 -33.56
M8 5990.73 9.91 6065.91 9.50 -7205.93 -19.92 -7319.21 -20.35 -406970.33 -28.02 -409953.25 -32.06
M9 -909.60 -1.42 -811.73 -1.88 -5249.88 -14.54 -5299.99 -11.36 -343623.05 -25.39 -344530.58 -22.83
M10 -6099.74 -6.85 -5952.42 -10.55 -3639.70 -13.31 -3670.37 -9.46 -228811.93 -20.58 -230903.21 -17.98
M11 -5214.99 -6.19 -5192.79 -9.48 318.03 1.11 331.71 0.83 -117514.59 -10.55 -117801.93 -9.19
M12 -417.11 -0.59 -461.33 -1.09 309.30 1.38 353.37 0.93 -61875.93 -5.74 -62036.10 -4.76
C 3.72 17.45 3.93 20.65
Y2 7179.39 19.24 7091.29 20.95
Y3 37256.96 71.44 37828.30 91.80
Y4 41496.42 68.57 43084.11 45.44 3857.12 0.35 4573.77 0.39
Y5 51677.70 143.86 50417.87 150.02 16966.61 1.56 13930.77 1.19
Y6 22131.24 2.00 20767.42 1.75
B 0.67 85.73 0.73 55.88 0.67 44.18 0.65 34.74 0.82 48.91 0.82 45.58
σDconst 3433.87 97.96 1582.91 87.37 55524.17 48.95
σD1 2630.69 33.45 2066.98 42.96 61361.61 22.53
σD2 54.48 0.53 -453.75 -6.06 -3247.50 -0.85
σD3 94.92 0.83 -451.93 -6.22 -4476.56 -1.31
σD4 1922.57 12.49 -1085.51 -19.99 -18622.78 -5.46
LL -19128.02 -18880.93 -10918.53 -10833.48 -14986.35 -14968.35
SC 38392.86 37921.48 21943.92 21795.19 30094.75 30078.73
Table 2: Parameter estimates for demand in PJM, E&W and Nord Pool. The first column for each market assumes
that volatility σD(t) is constant and the second column assumes volatility varies across seasons according to (6). Note
that σD(t) for winter is given by σ
D
1 , for spring is σ
D
1 + σ
D
2 , fall is σ
D
1 + σ
D
3 and summer is σ
D
1 + σ
D
4 . LL: Log-likelihood
and SC: Schwarz Criterion.
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E&W Nord Pool
Const Vol t-stat Const Vol t-stat
B0 6166.75 18.21 52.30 42.34
B 0.63 32.18 0.85 60.16
σC 2056.30 58.73 3.88 39.17
C -0.71 -2.54
M2 -762.91 -1.86 -11.42 -18.67
M3 -1508.77 -3.04 -23.39 -32.69
M4 -1100.47 -2.46 -30.28 -29.00
M5 -1498.00 -3.90 -22.36 -30.16
M6 -1623.46 -3.30 -8.57 -10.83
M7 -3381.43 -7.91 4.03 4.41
M8 -4635.72 -9.37 8.52 8.62
M9 -2248.21 -6.54 13.86 16.78
M10 -3742.38 -7.92 15.71 17.88
M11 -2885.80 -6.11 14.60 16.34
M12 -1270.50 -3.34 10.30 11.30
Y4 7.30 5.84
Y5 16.18 13.18
Y6 5.87 4.91
LL -1180.92 -3366.42
Table 3: Parameter estimates for capacity in E&W and Nord Pool
Figures
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PJM E&W Nord Pool
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
B0 3.2413 163.1605 2.6472 98.9554 3.3564 200.6536
M2 -0.0637 -2.3174 0.0291 0.9603 0.0379 2.2305
M3 0.0075 0.2786 0.0449 1.5170 0.1730 10.4027
M4 -0.0452 -1.6687 0.1118 3.9278 0.1813 10.7993
M5 -0.1294 -4.6273 0.1164 4.1190 0.0512 3.0833
M6 -0.1249 -4.5751 0.0850 2.9768 0.1147 6.839
M7 0.1098 4.0543 0.2373 8.3983 0.1494 8.9775
M8 0.1062 3.9221 0.3709 13.1061 0.3098 18.6285
M9 -0.0932 -3.3033 0.3583 12.5747 0.2138 13.3862
M10 -0.1252 -4.5042 0.3384 11.9633 0.2005 12.6572
M11 -0.2077 -7.4087 0.3469 12.1754 0.1695 10.6300
M12 -0.0404 -1.4533 0.2915 10.2235 0.0551 3.4783
Y1 0.3818 28.7939
Y2 0.5460 23.9803 -0.0833 -4.3399
Y3 0.5535 9.5811 0.0629 3.0118
Y4 0.7940 47.6204 0.2538 11.9236 -0.1352 -10.5361
Y5 0.9724 50.7857 -0.1258 -9.8002
Y6 0.3617 28.1650
Y7
α 0.0000380 34.5499 0.000014966 5.6122 0.000000752 17.4695
γ -0.0001486 -3.9060 -0.000043112 -16.8483 -0.006668338 -13.0018
R2 0.6196 0.8021 0.8235
SSR 248.2981 46.6000 15.4325
Table 4: Spot model and parameter estimates
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Coefficient Std Error t-stat Signif
1999-2002 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.55164 0.16626 3.31785 0.00095
Nov, Dec, Jan 0.46548 0.16206 2.87221 0.00418
May, June, July 1.30065 0.08527 15.25191 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct 0.53861 0.16105 3.34431 0.00086
φC -2.24838 1.00732 -2.23204 0.02587
Adjusted R2 0.60562
Mean Square Errors 200.42
2002-2006 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.11636 0.07653 1.52049 0.12866
Nov, Dec, Jan 0.36663 0.07215 5.08171 0.00000
May, June, July -0.04187 0.04110 -1.01878 0.30852
Aug, Sep, Oct 0.32195 0.07063 4.55837 0.00001
φC -3.92131 0.45467 -8.62447 0.00000
Adjusted R2 0.53570
Mean Square Errors 146.79
1999 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.59546 0.22512 2.64510 0.00867
Nov, Dec, Jan 0.48079 0.22019 2.18353 0.02991
May, June, July 1.52356 0.11683 13.04116 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct 1.20182 0.20663 5.81619 0.00000
φC 2.85035 1.39951 2.03668 0.04271
Adjusted R2 0.84361
Mean Square Errors 54.943
2000 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.65748 0.38310 1.71622 0.08733
Nov, Dec, Jan 1.40370 0.35614 3.94145 0.00010
May, June, July 1.94386 0.19631 9.90191 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct 1.12011 0.35219 3.18041 0.00165
φC 0.69783 2.36838 0.29464 0.76850
Adjusted R2 0.77831
Mean Square Errors 207.58
Table 5: PJM market prices of demand and capacity risk January 1999 to March 2002,
April 2002 to August 2006, 1999, 2000. When estimating φD(t) and φC for different
periods we keep all model parameters unchanged, but restrict the forward data to the
particular periods we want to focus on.
40
Coefficient Std Error t-stat Signif
2001-2005 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.36433 0.47116 0.77327 0.43951
Nov, Dec, Jan 2.73326 0.33923 8.05738 0.00000
May, June, July -0.13266 0.72444 -0.18312 0.85473
Aug, Sep, Oct 4.12213 0.42046 9.80374 0.00000
φC 0.53510 0.09341 5.72867 0.00000
Adjusted R2 0.83077
Mean Square Errors 26.26
2002 φD(t)
Feb, March, April -1.88930 0.77119 -2.44986 0.01496
Nov, Dec, Jan 2.82391 0.52457 5.38331 0.00000
May, June, July -8.36588 1.21832 -6.86671 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct -1.64332 0.68535 -2.39780 0.01721
φC 1.64332 0.68535 2.39780 0.01721
Adjusted R2 0.46172
Mean Square Errors 7.98
2003 φD(t)
Feb, March, April -2.04081 0.90864 -2.24599 0.02556
Nov, Dec, Jan 2.91950 0.61565 4.74211 0.00000
May, June, July -2.46126 1.34678 -1.82752 0.06879
Aug, Sep, Oct 2.89532 0.77203 3.75026 0.00022
φC 0.06715 0.16956 0.39604 0.69241
Adjusted R2 0.65149
Mean Square Errors 11.99
2004 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.10659 0.52472 0.20313 0.83920
Nov, Dec, Jan 1.29704 0.38219 3.39373 0.00080
May, June, July 0.42891 0.80338 0.53389 0.59388
Aug, Sep, Oct 2.87404 0.47051 6.10837 0.00000
φC 0.01141 0.10324 0.11052 0.91208
Adjusted R2 0.72906
Mean Square Errors 6.73
2005 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.89137 0.95574 0.93266 0.35190
Nov, Dec, Jan 2.78877 0.69506 4.01231 0.00008
May, June, July 0.86419 1.47663 0.58525 0.55891
Aug, Sep, Oct 5.87490 0.85131 6.90103 0.00000
φC 0.87961 0.19019 4.62484 0.00001
Adjusted R2 0.68631
Mean Square Errors 57.43
Table 6: E&W market prices of demand and capacity risk 2001-2005, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2005. When estimating φD(t) and φC for different periods we keep all model
parameters unchanged, but restrict the forward data to the particular periods we want
to focus on.
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Coefficient Std Error t-stat Signif
2003-2006 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.89836 0.11114 8.08325 0.00000
Nov, Dec, Jan 1.24279 0.09926 12.51998 0.00000
May, June, July 0.64019 0.14490 4.41825 0.00001
Aug, Sep, Oct 1.47927 0.10416 14.20239 0.00000
φC 0.50350 0.07246 6.94839 0.00000
Adjusted R2 0.80494
Mean Square Errors 24.76
2004 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.50788 0.08984 5.65321 0.00000
Nov, Dec, Jan 1.05481 0.08043 13.11525 0.00000
May, June, July 0.72267 0.11480 6.29509 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct 0.66691 0.08588 7.76537 0.00000
φC 0.37751 0.05749 6.56696 0.00000
Adjusted R2 0.12273
Mean Square Errors 3.51
2005 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 1.33298 0.24407 5.46135 0.00000
Nov, Dec, Jan 2.35596 0.21745 10.83446 0.00000
May, June, July 1.62829 0.31741 5.12995 0.00000
Aug, Sep, Oct 1.88832 0.23401 8.06941 0.00000
φC 1.01548 0.16274 6.23977 0.00000
Adjusted R2 0.26811
Mean Square Errors 20.21
2006 φD(t)
Feb, March, April 0.89782 0.12698 7.07055 0.00000
Nov, Dec, Jan 0.62746 0.11828 5.30476 0.00000
May, June, July 0.26146 0.16710 1.56474 0.11888
Aug, Sep, Oct 1.78522 0.11907 14.99295 0.00000
φC 0.37236 0.08267 4.50431 0.00001
Adjusted R2 0.80375
Mean Square Errors 19.46
Table 7: Nord Pool market prices of demand and capacity risk 2003-2006, 2004, 2005,
2006. When estimating φD(t) and φC for different periods we keep all model parameters
unchanged, but restrict the forward data to the particular periods we want to focus on.
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Figure 1: PJM demand and estimated seasonal component gD(t) over the period
January 1999 through August 2006
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Figure 2: E&W demand and estimated seasonal component gD(t) over the period
March 2001 through March 2006
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Figure 3: Nord Pool demand and estimated seasonal component gD(t) over the period
September 2003 through December 2006
PJM forward premium figures
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Figure 4: PJM spot prices over the period January 1999 through August 2006
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Figure 5: E&W spot prices over the period March 2001 through March 2006
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Figure 6: Nord Pool spot prices over the period January 1999 through December 2006
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Figure 7: PJM installed capacity over the period January 1999 through August 2006
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Figure 8: E&W capacity surplus and estimated seasonal component gC(t) over the
period March 2001 through March 2006
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Figure 9: Nord Pool capacity in terms of percentage of maximum reservoir capac-
ity and estimated seasonal component gC(t) over the period September 2003 through
December 2006
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Figure 10: PJM forward premium January 1999 through April 02
E&W forward premium figures
48
Apr 02 Oct 02 Apr 03 Oct 03 Apr 04 Oct 04 Apr 05 Oct 05 Apr 06
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fo
rw
ard
 Pr
em
ium
 $
Figure 11: PJM forward premium 2002 through 2006
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Figure 12: PJM forward premium 1999
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Figure 13: PJM forward premium 2000
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Figure 14: E&W forward premium April 2001 through December 05
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Figure 15: E&W forward premium 2002
Nord Pool forward premium figures
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Figure 16: E&W forward premium 2003
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Figure 17: E&W forward premium 2004
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Figure 18: E&W forward premium 2005
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Figure 19: Nord Pool forward premium September 2003 to December 2006
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Figure 20: Nord Pool forward premium 2004
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Figure 21: Nord Pool forward premium 2005
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Figure 22: Nord Pool forward premium 2006
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